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the bank and the depositor and not necessarily conclusive of the status of the
paper. The court held the bank was at least a pledgee-type security holder,
in addition to being an agent, having to the extent of the debt secured, all
the rights of an owner. The instant case is consonant with the provisions of
the Bank Collection Code" and the holding of the case has been embodied
in substance in the Uniform Commercial Code.la
When the withdrawal of credit amounts to only a partial portion of the
checks deposited, it appears to be the preferable approach to follow the
language of the instant case in labelling the bank a pledgee to the extent of
the fund advanced, in addition to being an agent, rather than denoting it as
an owner of the checks pro tanto. It would clarify the status of the parties
and be more consonant with the juridical realities for a court to draw a
decision founded on a single owner-pledgee relation encompassing the entire
deposit, rather than to dissect the deposit into two entities, the credit re-
tained in the bank and the fund advanced. The latter distinction would
necessitate the court considering the same deposit as being held by two
owners. A double title concept and a truncated agency relation, subsist-
ing only to the extent of the credit retained, would lend vigor to the view
that the law is replete with obscure conceptualisms and not at all concerned
with rendering lucid concrete relations in their empiric context.
EDWARD F. HARRINGTON
Brokerage Commissions Under Clayton Act—Seller's Reduction of
Prices Through Elimination of its Own Brokers.—Robinson v. Stanley
Home Products.'—Plaintiff was the sales agent of a Pennsylvania firm
which manufactured plastic cups. He had previously procured two orders
from the defendant, a Massachusetts corporation, when the defendant sought
to deal directly with the manufacturer. The manufacturer agreed and
plaintiff was later discharged. He claimed that the commission he would
have been paid as exclusive agent for the seller was in fact given to the de-
fendant in the form of a reduction in price. It was his contention that this
reduction was in violation of § 2(c) of the Clayton Act which forbids the
(4
. .. commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or
discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered . . . 1 ' 2
 Plaintiff alleged
that by receiving a reduced price, the defendant was in fact accepting a
discount in lieu of a commission, and that he was a person injured by such
violation and entitled to recover treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton
Acts The plaintiff further alleged that the reduced price was not offered to
other customers of the manufacturer and as such is a violation of § 2(a) of
the Clayton Act.
14I 2.
15 UCC § 4-208. 4-209.
1 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959).
2 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
a 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
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The question before the court was a novel one. To be decided was
whether the reduction in price by a seller to one of its customers, with a
contemporaneous dismissal by the seller of an agent who was receiving a
commission, was a violation of § 2(c). The U. S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts' held that plaintiff did not allege a cause of action
and further was not a "person" as contemplated by § 4.6 The Court of
Appeals, First Circuit, held that plaintiff had not shown that the reduction
in price was in lieu of a commission. While such a reduction could be a
violation of § 2(c), not every one is such. All that plaintiff had done was
show that the seller would not have been able to make the reduction if it
had paid plaintiff his commission. The court maintained that the purpose
of the reduction is the controlling factor. To hold that every reduction in
price made because there is a conversion to direct selling with resulting
savings, constitutes a violation would be to interpret § 2(c) as for-
bidding that which it does not. It was further held that a showing of
discrimination, even though a violation of § 2(a), will not necessarily
result in a violation of § 2(c). The court pointed out that if there was
discrimination between buyers after the elimination of the commission,
§ 2(a) would accomplish the purposes of the act. This may be true, but it
should be noted that there are different defenses available under § 2 (a) .
The U. S. District Court for the District of N. J.,/ having the same
parties before it and the same transaction, held that § 2(c) was not meant
to include within its scope agents of the seller, and the seller could
effect savings in his distribution cost by elimination of his agents and pass
such savings on to his customers. 8 The First Circuit does not seem to
aquiesce in this theory of interpretation. It is clear from the First Circuit
opinion that a seller is not forbidden to effect savings in his organization
and pass on such savings to his customers. What the court seems to be
saying is that the reduction must be for a legitimate purpose, which a dis-
count in lieu of brokerage is not, and upon the showing that such illegiti-
macy of purpose was the reason for lowering of the price, there will be a
violation, regardless of whether plaintiff was an agent of the buyer or the
seller. To the court it would seem that it is possible to have a violation
even though it is the seller's agent who is being eliminated. At this point
4 178 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1959).
5 49 Stat. 1426 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
6 Under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, it has been held that there must be a showing
that such discrimination "may" have an effect on competition. Such is not necessary
for a § 2(c) violation.
7 174 F. Supp. 414 (D.N.J. 1959).
8 The reason may be that in the case relied upon by the N.J. District Court, Broch
v. FTC, 261 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1958), the party against whom the Government was
proceeding was the agent of the seller, who had agreed to accept a reduction in his
commission in order that the price offered to the buyer would be lower. The Seventh
Circuit was not dealing with the seller or buyer as parties but merely with a dispute
between rival brokers, and the court felt there was not sufficient public interest. It well
may be that the First Circuit did not feel that the facts of the instant case were capable
of decision by the reasoning in the Broch case.
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there may be difficulty. How are we to determine when a seller may legiti-
mately eliminate a salesman and his commission and pass on the savings to
the buyer or when a similar elimination with a resulting reduction is a
violation of § 2(c)? § 2(c) has been generally given a strict interpretation,
and though this particular situation has never arisen, a concession reflect-
ing actual savings in the distribution cost of the seller given in the form of
a commission to the buyer in any form is per se a violation .° The court,
however, tells us that we must look to the purpose of the reduction. The
court assumed that the seller no longer employed an agency system and so
it is difficult to impute illegality to the reduction in price. It would seem
that the court would have no difficulty in finding a discount in lieu of a
commission had plaintiff been only relieved of this account and commission
and he or other agents continued selling to other accounts, and seller then
reduced the price to buyer by the amount of the commission. A situation
which is not so clear may present itself. If we assume that buyer goes to
seller after having been contacted by seller's agent and offers to deal direct
if seller will let buyer have the benefit of the commission being paid the
agent in the form of a discount, would there be a violation, for then the
purpose of the reduction is to give a discount in lieu of a commission?
Would not a showing that there was in fact discrimination by the seller in
favor of the buyer who offers to deal direct be an indication that the purpose
of the reduction was in fact in lieu of a commission? The court stated that
the fact that there was discrimination between customers does not mean that
the favored one received brokerage. This would seem to indicate a reluctance
on the part of the court to look any further than § 2(c) in order to establish
a violation. However, query whether one might look to price discrimina-
tion not as showing a violation of § 2(c), but to show the actual purpose
of the reduction.
The court was able, because it assumed the fact of the elimination of
all agency selling, to show that plaintiff had not shown the purpose of the
reduction to be anything but legitimate. It is unfortunate that the facts
were not such that the court could have given some answers to the problems
raised in this note. In the light of the decision, the agent, if considered a
person under § 4 of the act," must equate the reduction in price to a com-
mission, and may not do this by merely showing discrimination between
buyers. The seller is still faced with the problem of eliminating agents and
their commissions for he may not use the defense of cost justification.
Though the case speaks of the purpose of the reduction, it does not resolve
9
 Report of Attorney General's Committee to Study the Anti-Trust Laws 189 (1955).
10 The court did not take up the matter of whether plaintiff was a "person" under
the act, but it did seem to agree with the district court which held that plaintiff had
not been directly injured by the price differential and so was not within the scope of
the act, § 4.
The court also found that the tort claim of plaintiff to the effect that that de-
fendant had interfered with an advantageous continuous business relationship was
doubtful, for defendant was acting for its economic benefit and would be privileged.
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the problems surrounding the showing of such purpose by either the seller
or his agent.
ANTHONY M. FREDELLA
Chattel Mortgages—Bill of Sale to Secure Debt—Effect of Granting
Borrower Permission to Sell the Secured Chattel.—Peopies Loan e-4
Finance Corporation of Rome v. McBurnette.'—An action of trover was
brought in Georgia to recover possession of an automobile. The plaintiff
granted a loan to an automobile dealer, taking a "bill of sale to secure the
debt" to the car, such bill being duly recorded as required by statute. 2 The
bill of sale stated that the dealer had the privilege of selling the car, the
proceeds to be impressed in a trust for the benefit of the plaintiff, and to be
used to retire the debt.3 Subsequently, the dealer delivered the car to a third
person in settlement of a personal gambling debt. Thereafter the car was
sold to the defendant, a bona fide purchaser for value. The defendant's
demurrer was sustained in the lower court. On the plaintiff's appeal to the
Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2, affirmed. HELD: the bona fide
purchaser took free of the lien of the security instrument.
Usually, one may not acquire title to a chattel from a person who him-
self has no title. However, in the present instance, the recorded bill of sale
expressly granted the dealer-borrower the power to sell the chattel consti-
tuting the security with the proceeds to be held in trust for the lender. It is
established in Georgia that one who lends money, receives and records a bill
of sale to a chattel given as security, and by express provision or clear impli-
cation of the agreement authorizes the sale of the secured chattel, causes the
borrower to become his agent for the sale and for the collection of the pro-
ceeds with the obligation to account for them. When the borrower disposes
of the chattel in the due course of business, the lender's security title is ex-
tinguished and can not be asserted as against a bona fide purchaser for
value.4 By granting such permission to sell the lender places a strong re-
liance on the borrower's honesty in dealing with the chattel and in accounting
1 100 Ga. App. 4, 110 S.E.2d (2d Div. 1959).
2 In Georgia, a bill of sale to secure a debt transfers title to the lender until the
debt is paid. The instrument must be recorded. if it is not it remains valid only
between the parties executing it, and as to others, is to be treated as an unrecorded
deed of bargain and sale. Sec Manchester Motors Inc. v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,
91 Ga. App. 811, 87 5.E.2d 342 (2d Div. 1955) ; Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Citizens & So. National Bank, 68 Ga. App. 393, 23 S.E.2d 198 (1st Div. 1942) ; Keel v.
Attaway, 65 Ga. App. 172, 15 S.E.2d 562 (1st Div. 1941).
3 The bill of sale recited: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it is
understood that the maker is a dealer in automobiles. He is hereby permitted to sell
the above described property. In the event of such sale, the proceeds shall immediately
become impressed in a trust for the use and benefit of the holder of this instrument.
The said funds shall immediately be used to retire this instrument and for no other
purpose."
4 Automobile Financing Inc. v. Downing Motors Inc., 95 Ga. App. 711, 98
S.E.2d 643 (1st Div. 1957); Gernazian v. Harrison, 66 Ga. App. 689, 19 S.E.2d
165 (2d Div. 1942).
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